

Adolescence and Interpretation: The vexed question of discursive modes, unconscious ideas and symbolic transitivism

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To Carlos Kachinovsky

*I only expected his comments on this text
and he left us with nothing less than his memory.*

Introduction

I must admit that I don't agree with ethos separation within psychoanalysis, or with any kind of distinction clearly defined as "psychoanalysis speciality" which denotes a psychoanalytic "technique" in itself, with definable standards according to age or psychopathology. Of course, this has nothing to do with the fact that I agree in that it is possible and sometimes necessary to set certain ranges which help us to carry out our practice. My opinion is due to the fact that I prioritize Psychoanalysis as on unconscious experience for both the analyzand and the analyst, although from different positions and also with different aims. The analyst's theoretical resource is, therefore, as necessary as insufficient and eccentric to the experience. This experience constitutes, in my opinion, a repressed² child nucleus ineffable in itself, but the cause of all possible accounts, including those of psychoanalytical theory. Singular for both, each analyst at a certain moment with a patient and each analyzand, thus the generalizations that could be made have an unavoidable nucleus of unsteadiness. Artisan³, at least so far, since I think that Psychoanalysis has its difficult specificity in the unconscious experience that each analyst has of their own analysis like a crucible of their own history and desires, the transmission from their teachers, colleagues, reading and from practice with their analyzands. That is to say, something impossible to trap rationally and that

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² Agamben, G., "Infancy and History. Destruction of the experience and origin of the history." Adriana Hidalgo Bs. As. 2001 page 66

³ Baranger ,W. "The Analytical Situation as artisan product from "Psychoanalytical Crafts" Kargieman, Buenos Aires, 1994 pp 445-462

becomes hardly a stroke in discourses. I realize, of course, that these preferences are quite against the grain concerning today's cultural tendencies, from which Psychoanalysis is not excluded.

The fact that this strong nucleus of Psychoanalysis has an enigmatic and singular gist, does not restrain us from making accounts of our experiences, but on the contrary, encourages us to make them. The fact that these accounts have to be made in formats_ "papers" which come from other fields of knowledge, has an unavoidable side and a confrontable one, a conflict which I would rather not elude.

I am thus, mentioning briefly just starting points in order to set myself in front of two concepts: interpretation and adolescence. I am not thinking there of a crossroads between two clearly defined lines- what is adolescence, what is interpretation and how to understand that crossroads?- but as an open field to multiple peculiarities about which I will only choose certain aspects. These will refer to a zone of the analytical experience where verbal, gestural and corporal discursive acts, appear in both, the analyzand and the analyst, sometimes in the limits of analysis but with the intention of introducing them in it. In certain occasions by setting the scene others by acting out, which convokes and strikes us, others by looming as passages to the act.

I will point out briefly some tendencies. I understand adolescence as an "open structure"⁴ rather than an ethos category, because of major flexibility among psychical instances, identification and des-identification in their different forms, between the ego and the other. The opening and flexibility, which includes the ways to give an account_ ludic, verbal, gestural, corporal acts, _ challenge us in our possibility of offering ourselves also in those discursive availabilities where words and thoughts might not be more than just stammers. This fact keeps us more in touch with the habitual risks of our intervention, from which I will stand out two. Interpretation as the translation into language from the psychoanalytical theories, from words, games and the patient's acts⁵, and transferential performance (counter-transference), which might include among its several fashions, the former risk. Both stages get round to working the unconscious experience at stake and lead us to the loss of analytical effectivity and slide towards psychotherapies with pedagogical spirit. If these risks are present in any analysis, it is also true that adolescents in general provoke them on us more and forgive us less because of them.

⁴ Kristeva, Julia; "the adolescent Novel". Adolescence; 1986,4,1

⁵ Mannoni, Octave; Procustus' setee" Nueva Vision. p. 20

Although we cannot do without our theoretical references and they will be here both implicitly and explicitly, I would rather keep to a level close to the account of experiences, at least as a starting point.

Ludic scenes: scene setting and ideas*

The beginning of adolescence is as singular as contextual. However, we know that in our work we can find in adolescence much of child analysis. It is very interesting when we have been working with a child who turns into early adolescence, as the following example will show.

T, a twelve-year-old boy, comes to the session with certain excitement since at school they had had a sexual education lesson about male and female genital anatomy. He told me enthusiastically what he had learnt about female genital organs but when he came to describe the interior of the genitals, he got stuck and finally said, "it has something like two balls inside".

In a later session he was trying to draw a woman's body but he couldn't draw it below the waist. He drew and rubbed out, "*I can't do it,*" he said. Then he asked, "*Have you read all the books you have in the other consulting room? You've got lots of books!*" I made an interrogative gesture... (it is difficult to explain a gesture since it condenses and opens at the same time) He went on, "*I'm going to be a psychoanalyst, like you, because when you are asked something you don't have to answer, you just have to open your eyes like this* (he imitated me) "*What have you read so many books for if you know nothing?*" I made the gesture again and drew-wrote- a question mark on the sheet where his drawing was, beside it. I was surprised by the fact that it lay in parallel to his unfinished female drawing. The curve of the mark lay by the woman's bosom and the dot, in the lower part, where the drawing had been stopped. "*Look,*" he said and drew the head on top of the mark which now was being turned into a body. "*Is that the way you make a dot?*" he said. I realized I had made it like a little circle. He continued drawing the profile of a woman's body, the hips and legs.

A- "You've done it!"

P- "*Yes. My father told me about my grandfather ("T" hadn't met him), he was moved and told me he suffered a lot when he died.*"

He looked afflicted. He continued drawing. "*Do you mean that I should start realizing things by myself?... but I prefer you to teach me because I am finding it hard.*"

I told him that I knew it was hard for him, just as it had been hard for his father to tell him how he felt about his father and that it had taken him some time but had finally done it.

"Yes, it's the first time he has told me something like that."

...

Next session I welcomed him and stayed behind for a while. He was supposed to have entered the consulting room but when I went in I didn't find him there but heard him say "Come in" from the adult's consulting room. He was standing behind the door, just like I used to do. I went in, surprised, rather shocked and he said, "*Ah, I scared you!, but now we are going to the other consulting room.*"

The great issues we were experimenting in transference can be appreciated in what I have just mentioned but, my interest here lies in the expressive fashions that were taking us. In a child analysis context we can notice an interaction among play and verbal discourse, the drawing, the body gestures and the "staging". These latter seem to be expressive fashions that stand out in adolescence. We are intensely demanded of not only verbal discourse but also gestural, corporal, graphic ones from the patient and in ourselves, where the unconscious appears as unexpected, as an idea. The "interpretation" the analyst makes is quite close to the analyst's idea which appears within those discursive fashions. The question mark which I wrote or drew was also unexpected to myself. It was he who remarked on whether I always made dots like a circle, which is not always so, but I had done it then. The ideas in the analyst, something which takes us by surprise, which we sometimes offer and at other times are part of our inner work, many times appear as little acts of words or intonation, of gestures, of writing. Allowing for such surprises in the singular context of each analysis experience, since that's how they appear, means allowing for the unconscious to appear in ourselves. We are ready for error but confident that it is the unconscious experience that makes the analysis possible. The analyst's effective intervention seems to be closer to those little things which arise than from elaborated interpretations.

To interpret is to put into words, but this statement is obviously not enough since that implies all saying. Putting into words the images that the patient brings about in verbal, gestural, corporal, ludic discourse. This is a little more specified because in this way we are quoting the passage from the image to the word. But, it is also what an analyzand starts to do when giving an account of a dream or fantasy. With no intention of giving a general answer to the concept of interpretation, I do feel interested in going over the above mentioned situation, which is common in child and adolescent analysis and has quite an elemental

structure. The unconscious idea of drawing that graphic question mark was at the same time the sketch of a woman's figure.

The graphic sign was preceded by an interrogative body gesture when the patient referred to the "lot of books" I have. I must admit that there was in me a very basic interrogation, between body and word, which arose from my placing myself between my library and a woman's sexuality. Perhaps it was also a gesture of suspension to the answer he was demanding. That "lot of books" he mentioned, exceeded my bookshelf. "Lot" implies excess, also something indiscriminate, gathered, deposited, with the characteristics of anal object. He resorted to a power which is at the same time phallic and anal, but also questioned it (have I really read all those books?)

The anatomical-physiological knowledge he had received about female genitals was impregnated and interfered by unconscious fantasies referred to an imago of a phallic woman, since he had drawn her with two balls inside the female genitals. With my gesture I transmitted wonder and a certain suspense of expectation. Suspense has an important psychic function as far as it can be tolerated and introjected. With the graphic question mark or the sketch of a woman based on a circle, I transmitted something more unawares. The question mark turned into the outline of a woman and the dot-circle-hole questioning him, seemed to lead him to draw the head first and the hips and legs afterwards. The unconscious transmitted in that experience assembled by both of us enabled him to turn a trace into the drawing of a woman.

I am interested in making a stand on this elemental and quite unexceptional situation in child and adolescent analysis because it is very frequent to see the coexistence in those analyses of gestural, graphical, corporal, choreographical, etc. significant, together with verbal ones. I would like to remark on the importance of the transmission of unconscious traces which from the analyst's symbolic castration experimented in transference, might be appropriated by the patient.

In this small example the idea also came from the patient in that unexpected "representation" of me, the change of roles, the scene set in act of the words he had said before, "I want to be a psychoanalyst like you." The "lot of books" was something very important to him, about knowledge, knowing about sex, but at the same time: I don't know. The gestural situation of mirror game, apparently imitative, moved a lot of things. Being a grown-up man, being like a father-analyst and being able not to know and wondering. We could say that a revitalized

grandeur insinuated which enabled him to play both roles, imitating me⁶ (6). In the next session he “represented” that ludic situation of being the analyst by entering the adult’s consulting room and welcoming me, adjudging me fright and invitng me to return to our child’s consulting room. The words “*I would rather you taught me because I’m finding it hard*” resounded in my ears.

The scenes I am giving an account of are especially condensed, since in them work concerning a woman’s sexuality , the difference between sexes, the rivalry with his father, the father-grandfather’s death and the father-son’s pain could be seen. This enabled him to go over different positions in himself through scenes of “*representation in act*” with me. The different scenes seemed to be formed like a mirror labyrinth between both of us, but at the same time enabled him to experience a change of positions which gave mobility among scenes.

The mobility of this game of scene representation, which implies the gestural imitation, and verbal and graphic expressions, enables unconscious desire movements which seem to indicate that we are not only dealing with transitory imaginative identifications but also with a work with more symbolic aspects (man’s and woman’s positions, father’s and son’s positions in geneology, symbolic castration of the father-analyst). The scene game where he moved among different characters also seemed to be a way of making des-identifications. I think it may be important to emphasize the symbolic value of this work because otherwise the imaginary abundance of all these scene settings might make us remain only in them. In order to make this possible, it might seem necessary not to fill with interpretative sense but on the contrary, to work from the analyst’s ideas.

Intervention in the act

The act, understood as doing with words, gestures and behavior, is something that the analyst, as a principle, stops in order to give place to transference interpretation. Perhaps anything that can imply a certain exercise of power in transference has deserved a strong objection to being exercised, objection which we share since the analytical work requires so. But, perhaps also, as it was

⁶ Octave Mannoni has remarked on the function of play in adolescent analysis. Taking into account Winnicott’s theories on play, he proposes opening a place for play in the consultation. Identifications will be put at stake in order to work them without intervening in the choice of the field of identifications. The analyst who remains in the place of that one “who knows” will not obtain good results from work with adolescents, he must risk being doubted about his knowledge. The play with identifications is sought in order to work them indirectly. Mannoni, Octave 81989) “Intense and permanent amazement”Chapter Is adolescence “analyzable”?” Ed. Gedisa. Bs.As.

expressed many decades ago by Serge Viderman⁷, this may be due to a need to become un-related to our hypnotic and hypno-cathartic backgrounds. I recognize that phrases like: accepting the strength awarded to us under the condition of not exercising it or of exercising it only a little in the interpretation in transference with words, are references I have within me as an analyst. Therefore, when I feel the impulse of doing with words, gestures or behaviour, something like a inner device seems to be set off which makes me stop and activates inner work about what moves me to do so. On the whole, I think that this suspension of the act has foundations to exist. This is why, in any analysis and especially when, apart from words, discursive modes in which play, scene setting, drawing, etc. are implied, we recognize ourselves in actions which many times happen before being thought and whose analytical value can be appreciated "après-coup". These seem to tell us about an unconscious doing, sometimes through little "ideas", which might have at least sometimes, an unconscious transmission function which the patient might get hold of.

M. had come, as he usually did, by bicycle. But this time he had brought it up in the lift into the flat where my consulting room is. This implied a lot of noise and manoeuvres. Many other times he had left it downstairs, under the caretaker's surveillance, but this time he had not seen him. I came to realize more directly, since the caretaker was not in-between, that it meant taking care of something very personal and important. Besides we were working self-destructive acts of small body harm, accidental and provoked, which were of concern (more to me than to him). The body, especially what meant genealogical identity features, like his hair because of its black colour and curls, and his dark and "thick" skin, unlike those of his adoptive parents, whose hair was straight, and skin was fair, had turned into a painful and cruel scene. He used to pull out his hair, hurt his skin accidentally and later take out the blood crust thus preventing healing, and when anguished, make small superficial cuts on himself. The latter had appeared in situations when he felt he didn't deserve love.

That session we had been working in transference these filial issues which in him unfolded in different mother imagos; mother (biological) who had thrown him away, mother (adoptive) who had stolen him, robbed mother, whore mother, missing and murdered mother (a fantasy that had its origins in his parents), and finally mother who had not been able to see and recognize body features which were very different from her own⁸. During that session M. told me that as he was

⁷ Viderman, Serge, "The construction of the analytical space." Denoël, Paris.

⁸ This last point has always seemed very remarkable to me in early identifications, including the primary identification of children adopted at birth and which depends on both adoptive parents. I mean, in a few

coming there by bike along a sloping avenue, full of heavy traffic, he could not brake at junctions because his brakes were bad, and that he had to brake using his feet. We talked about the danger of his actions and the lack of self-control he was going through by placing his body and life at risk. The session had several derivations, both towards his experience of his mother who didn't hold him and gave him away, she let him go or "threw him away" as he felt it had happened, and towards his parents who didn't get him with all that he also brought from others. At the end of the session, M. took his bike and told me he was going to ride slowly so as to be able to use his feet to brake. I told him that was not enough, that it was impossible to ride in such condition. I remember this as an intense but peaceful moment for both of us. We looked at one another in an atmosphere I could describe as inhabited by the painful strain between the desire of caring and destroying, at the same time as the act of holding him was reinstalled in act. He said to me, "*Ok I'll walk with the bike at my side. It's upwards but not so far away.*"

What are we going to do with this lack of control, with this wild situation* ,with this need to hurt yourself if we consider at the same time that you are suffering because there is something alive and important to care for?

But this "mixture" , this stop to something that sets loose and throws away, is set in act there "with me"- in transference-and he demands an act. It is not a pragmatic act of care only, since my words could have been said by anyone with common sense. It is about recognizing an unconscious experience which we both shared in this scene. I could say that I introduce prohibition with words in act, such as we can understand a more symbolic dimension of castration, which he feels as harm and death. However, in the intense transferential experience we had, my words spoke more about the castration in me, in the insufficiency of the interpretation and of the analytical work during the session, in the limit of my power concerning that wild strength and the outcoming painful recognition in me of that insufficiency and risk. This transmission, I don't know how else to express it since it exceeds what we habitually understand as "interpretation", is what I think happened in act. The effectiveness of intervening in transference so that something more symbolic of the castration "is made flesh" (as in ritual or religious act, e.g. circumcision), I think that goes fundamentally through the experience of this "limit" or painful "insufficiency" in the analyst. I don't think this is limited to analysis but

words, that the necessary appropriation_by identification_ that parents make with reference to their newly-born child (resemblances) leads in cases of adoption to a refusal of foreign features, whose lack of recognition falls upon the constitution of the speculative Ego and upon the primary identification of the child. These unrecognised features (not invested) will continue insisting as foreign and alien facts in act. Of course, it is not something that can be seen only in newly-born child adoption. "About features and adoptions" J. García; 2001.

that it is part of life. I regard as useful to think it as a way of more complex transitivism which might make easier to the person experimenting it (the patient in this case) a more symbolic, way of identification- appropriation⁹.

I'm concerned about emphasizing this act- of the analyst- as a result of an unconscious experience in transference, which is the outcome, at least somehow, of the "castration" in the analyst, since I know about the easy sliding forwards to ideological interventions due to the exercise of power, or psychotherapeutical and pedagogical ones. It is a border to be dealt with great care as there is also temptation to the act -I am referring now to the "acting out"- of the analyst, which I think in the opposite sense to that I am putting forward here (in relation to the "castration" and "Eros")

M's analysis or (with M) enabled me to notice and experiment the return in act of feeling loose, unrecognized, in different fashions. When he started analysis, at the age of 11 or 12, when we worked in the play room there was a time when we built paper planes. At first he wanted me to help him make them and we were both challenged to make them glide or at least not to crash-land. Later on, he started to identify the planes by writing on them acronyms of sports clubs and country names. M. got confused and matched acronyms- names- to clubs and countries they didn't belong to. That is to say, the planes had names, badges or marks, but they did not coincide with the country or club he said they belonged to or he didn't know who they belonged to. Working on those letters or features with no basis, the game with the planes changed. He threw them, made them glide and I had to catch them before they crashed down or vice versa. The one who threw them was challenged to make them fly, and the other one was supposed to "catch them in flight"*. But the game changed during one session. M. saw that the window of the consulting room (9th floor) was a little open so he started trying to throw the planes so that they flew out through it.

At first I thought it was another way of wanting to "score goals", to beat me, "to make the plane fly through the hole", etc., but I noticed that in fact I was not taking part in this game ("I was off-side") and the game in itself was over. I didn't know what was happening. He had turned from playing with me with different affective shades to not seeing me, absorbed- rather viciously- in trying to make his planes fly through the little opening. I tried to get back into the game, by catching the planes as formerly. I did so and I interpreted it, but I did not manage to be present for him. I was afraid, something like an extreme closeness between M and the planes falling out of the window, something one feels when a little child

⁹ Jean Bergès, Gabriel Balbo – "About transitivism". Nueva Vision, Buenos Aires, 1999.

approaches an opening. And thus, I "acted". I stood in front of the opening, closed the window and told him that all the planes, whatever their acronyms or marks, belonged there, that we had made them there to play in there. After that session M. started to come very tired and to lie down in the bench where there were cushions and to fall asleep. I used to sit by his side and some time before the end of the session I started to talk and awoke him. The atmosphere at the beginning was clearly depressive. All the marks and acronyms seemed to have been there exhausting him but also, muttering in the awakening.

Three years later, he was an early adolescent and these features reappeared in other scenes. One of the changes between child and adolescent is that of their scenes. In a child the scenes are much closer to us. It was no longer the little paper plane we had built during a session and with which we had created games that were interrupted by a different act, from which I was excluded, and he was too stuck to the object that threatened with disaster (crash down). Now it was his bike, so important for an adolescent, close to his body, to his possibilities of moving outdoors (and out of the consulting room). Undoubtedly, the risk was there. But this time he had brought it into the consulting room and had told me about that risk. I could feel, again, the closeness between him and his object in the wildness (lack of control), the free fall, however precariously braked with his feet. He had placed me there to make me feel again that fright at something wrong happening to him, to see me feel my fright at his hurting himself or falling -dying- as if he had to recognize himself in the effect created in me.

Although a distinction can be conceptually made among "act" (*agieren*), "acting out" and the "passage to the act" with reference to the existence or not of symbolization, and to whether the action is addressed to the Other¹⁰ or not, practice places us in these borders where such distinction moves in each scene. During the game we were clearly at the "act" level. The episode about the bike with no brakes which happened and he told me about it at the same time, is placed at the "acting out" level, whereas the interruption of the game with the plane from which I was excluded and the threat of risk which arose from the episode of the bike with no brakes, seem to be closer to a "passage to the act".

They are not yet a passage because the act appears with reference to my place in transference. But it looms in the risk and appeals to the analytical act which before symbolizing, since it might be so "*après coup*", will have to be established as an unconscious experience of life wish. The latter should not be understood as either a philosophical or mundane expression. It is the anguish of his death in me

¹⁰ Lacan, Jacques, The Seminar, Book 10. The Anguish; IX. pp 127- , 1962-63. Paidós

as an unconscious experience of castration which moves me in wish. The transitivism of the unconscious experience can enable the restoration of the subjectivation of his wishes, and with it, the symbolic structure threatened by the passage to the act.

Even though the transitivism phenomena which can enable the formation of more symbolic identifications can be found at any age, it is true that when identifications (all) are especially convoked and at bay, as is happens in adolescence, these phenomena have more relevance. Moreover, in adolescence, they are even more pre-eminent due to the intense participation of the body in gesture and act with the others, stage where words are, may be and need to be very close , brewing in those acts .

This change of tranferential scene and of the ways the unconscious experience is actualized, convoking us in the same scene, should make us re- consider our tendency to think the act in these cases as transgressions to the setting, both by the patient and the analyst. It is the setting itself that is placed in different scenes with different modes, of expression, in which the analyst is required to function. Far from thinking of a loss of importance of the setting, what is at stake is an opening of that concept to the different outlines of the act, which questions our response or intervention capacity in order to support the wish. From my point of view, this is possible, not in a rational level that implies especially the ego, but provided we can go through an unconscious experience of castration.

I think these experiences can be considered in several ways and with different theoretical resources which, to my mind, are not as decisive concerning what we can transmit in them. At all events they are personal preferences, sometimes circumstantial, which might have the merit of opening little windows to sometimes very fruitful analytical thinking roads.

Games with mirrors

The intensity of the staging through accounts assembled in different ways goes through, I would say, necessarily intense moments of mirror-like experiences. These can take part in the scenographic game, in situations that appear like imitations but also, in older adolescents (middle adolescence for example) in thoughts and discourse. Puns on words and with thoughts are sometimes very difficult to distinguish from certain mental functioning. Beyond the fact that certain psychopathological conformations might be plentiful in these phenomena, which is true, these phenomena are somehow always present and challenge us to transit

them from within the experience itself. I will mention several different experiences with analyzands at middle adolescence.

Some years ago a colleague consulted me about a patient who during a session made him feel confused. The youngster started by saying that he didn't feel like going to that session because he was feeling good. He said "*It's easier when one is at the bottom, screaming*". It seemed that he found it difficult to be with his analyst unless he had that painful root which enabled him to know which place he was speaking from. He continued saying: "*When I went to the bedroom I saw "C" looking at himself in the mirror making gestures. I had been doing the same, practicing in front of the mirror before they came (Pause)I started to sweat (in session)...I was finding it interesting to be able to share these obscurities. I suggested "C" talking about you.*". The analyst:- "*Talking about me?" . No! About me. About my story. As if getting rid of myself... It came to my mind while reading San Agustin. It is as if extricating from oneself. Talking about myself as if I were somebody else. As if I talked in the third person singular, about myself. As a way of being able to share yourself. It is rather like losing the ego. It is easier to give an account in the third person than in the first one. How many poems and books written in the third person are in fact autobiographies? This could do here. I don't know if it would do for you" _ It does for you... Has it to do with your appropriation of San Agustin? "*It's like a confession and San Agustin says that in order to confess himself he has to break free of his conscience. He talks about depositing his being in God and being able to look at himself from above. That called my attention. Regarding himself from above.- You are talking about how to incorporate those things... reading listening, like in the mirror... incorporating something like this. "It's quite true what you have said. I found it bitter to seek a model to incorporate things. Now I am sweating..." -Something you are feeling here now, incorporating it makes you sweat and it makes you feel that it is good.**

He is an adolescent, who is about 17 years old, apparently going through the matters of the "self", the "other", self-observation, the possibilities of self-knowledge and seeking his own story accounts, and models or ideals. In a larger or smaller scale these are matters that concern adolescents at a middle stage, that which Anna Freud described as intense and many times aimless philosophical concerns¹¹, which make analysis difficult. The analyst told me that during the session he seemed to be more confused than the patient. We could also imagine how much the analyst sweated in trying to approach such a humane and intense way of incorporation as well as of doubtful rationality when one starts from the idea of

¹¹ Freud, Anna Psychoanalysis of child and adolescent development. Paidós, Buenos Aires. Chapter XI.

radical separation "ego", "other", "inside", "outside". His abstract thought, which made the analyst mistrust its veracity, however was accompanied by the body reaction of sweating. He is really craving for knowledge, experiences and traces to incorporate. It was an issue being dealt with in different ways. Here he incorporated and sweated, perhaps like babies do, who look how they are being watched while being nursed. In this case wondering how it could be thought and accounted from a third place. He recreates mirror-like functionings and he began to realize the possibility of looking at himself from another place in that reference to San Agustin, rid of the ego who looks and sees himself in the other. He refers to that place as above, the place of God. If we abstain from what this implies as philosophical speculation and place ourselves in our field, we can appreciate the youngster's resources - why not ludic?- who has a flat, symbolic-oedipal structure, collapsed in its thirdness, to keep the place of the father who, in his experience, has been very precariously constituted.

By reading the material, an instance distant from the unconscious transference experience of both of them, we could have expected and understood, perhaps, what the patient referred to. However, the analyst was urged to ask whether it was he who the patient wanted to talk about. It was an intense moment where the patient's ego remained in the analyst. "I don't know if it would do for you" seemed to be a maximum offering to the analyst. In situations where mirror or double games take place, as in Narcissus, it seems necessary a full surrender to an image of himself which creates another one, whom he loves and needs to be loved. Narcissus drowns delivering love for that liquid other. The subjective anchorage loss is at peak at that moment. "It does for you, to appropriate something" -the analyst said- he brought him back to a very precarious place which the patient doesn't recognize unless he is there "at the bottom, screaming."

It is not clear where to place the "ego" he talked about. "You" means "I" but in order to be so an incorporation through the analyst was needed, that is to say from something that returned from the analyst like acknowledgement and like something good. The latter could be thought from the approach of various authors. For the sweat also places us in the fear of what he could incorporate, something that he mentioned at another moment of the session and which is not referred to here. It places us in the Kleinian schizo-paranoid position, in Bion's reverie function, in Lacan's mirror stage and in Pier Aulagnier's primary violence, just to give some examples. All these are feasible approaches to establish a level of comprehension of those experiences. Nevertheless, the analyst is far from placing himself in a theoretical level. The experience demands a level where words and ideas arise shakily and quite craftily, although several theoretical references are present, of

course. The patient seemed to feel this closeness of the analyst's words, he recognized what he was saying to him as true. He recognized the bitterness of incorporating, a flavour which certainly did not refer to something good in his memory, but that might be taking place there, at least as a possibility of incorporation from a closer and more humane third place than the God he had needed to resort to. If this is so, the mirror-like experience intensity of them both would be enabling a movement towards the opening to the other (Other) and to the appropriation of words, traces, tolerable nourishment in an intense corporal experience. We can notice how far it is possible to actualize and re-create in analysis basic experiences for the psychism symbolic matrix. It is a great challenge for us if these occur only as the repetition of something which always fails in its constitution, or if that repetition enables a re-creation of symbolic structure. The situation I'm referring to is punctual and does not allow for more than peeping a possibility of structural change to put the problem forward. This re-actualization is expected to appear in different ways and at different levels in transference to continue weaving itself, from the unconscious experience, as a symbolic functioning structure.

The analytical references to these intense mirror-like moments might be many and thorough. Once a patient asked me, "Did I say that or did you?" It is clear that the analyst knew or may have known who had said it. However, this is not always so. Words and ideas are in the session, in imaginaries whose authorship is not clearly separable from the double, since it comes from places of enunciation of discourses which clearly exceed us and are constituted as strong dual experiences.

For instance, it is common for an analysand to discover something we had already said to him. "I have realized -a young patient said- that I had never felt that way, that my emptiness must have something to do with the urge to say every single thing and not to keep anything to myself and with this speed with which I have to speak everything. Afterwards I finish empty and feel that what I have said is neither mine nor true" He was repeating something I had said several sessions before although differently. His words sounded like the description of emptying internal contents, an incontinence concerning feelings and ideas, but it also is acknowledgement to a discourse with no subject. The subject is missing in this "saying everything" with words separated from his unconscious representations, in a kind of chatter. "Speaking", in its real sense implies being taken for words that have their anchorage in unconscious trails, which for some important reason was not taking place in my patient.

In the examples I have mentioned, after the mirror-like identification, this little movement of interiorization appeared, as a consequence of the appearance of a

third place of reference, a look that allows for speaking without getting lost in the other. The idea of "interiorization" corresponds with a subjective experience which talks about something that used to appear as an identification in the other and now has turned into an unconscious experience. The fact that I disappeared as the author of the words which were now his, evokes the transitivism but, not in a situation of imaginary confusion but in "symbolic transitivism" (as that described by Berges and Balbo, work quoted) which turns auspicious for the constitution of the subject. In other words, it could be said that it was not just a confusion but the beginning of an unconscious interiorization- introjection.

To the enclosure of resounding subjectivities –dual transference-, the analyst offers with his function, a change of position, a dial change, which breaks that enclosure allowing for an interrogation and the chance of assuming it as own.

The youngster who felt interior emptiness had tried to kill himself by crashing down off a cliff in his car, and it was only fate that prevented his death. A blind and incoercible impulse had led him there to hurl himself. For a while he wondered "why?", but cast the doubt aside, accelerated and hurled himself. I had been informed about this before I met him, however, when I first saw him with his plaster cast and orthopedics I could not help being surprised and asking, "Ah! What has happened to you?!" It seems necessary for me to state that this does not usually happen to me. I reacted as if I had been with someone I knew and that just then I had learnt about something that had happened to him, feeling surprised by what I was seeing, when in fact it was someone I had never seen before and whose accident I had been told about.

He neither had nor has an explanation or fantasy about what led him to that passage to the act. He didn't feel pain in his body and even less psychical pain. He was glad to have survived to "great death". It was like starting a journey amid thick fog which prevented us from seeing where we were treading on. There was no consistent subjectivity there. He felt "Nothing". The challenge was beginning to construct it, even against the powers that had devastated it and perhaps, especially, from the transitivism which arose when I saw him. He didn't have an interiority experience. The idea of constructing a subjectivity, which is only possible through the rescue of missing traces, standing myself on mirror-like phenomena and in transitivism, was a starting point which I thought useful though long. The construction of the transference in these cases takes a long time in an analysis. We work constructing and de-constructing imaginary transference when we subjectivize.

In the limits of interpretation or interpretation in the limits

Interpreting is, in any discipline we think of, a way of reading signs. Each discipline and each interpreter will have its interpreters. In Psychoanalysis there is also a wide variety of interpreters. From transferential actualization, a preliminary condition to every saying and doing in analysis, will stand out signs which refer us to partial drives, erogenous zones, structures of the organization of human sexuality as the primal scene and, with the participation of the "Other"- prior to or together with the partial drives- another transferential dynamics and of the reading of analytical experience, opens.

We could continue quoting many other reading elements but, in all cases, interpretation in Psychoanalysis will have to cut off its never-ending possibilities, from a mirror gallery where the language speaks of the language according to the reflections in different reference schemes (views). I believe that rescuing oneself implies assuming precariousness, babbling out of the unconscious experience which we unavoidably live in intense transference imaginaries.

Nevertheless, interpreting, even in this hint to words that are born hesitatingly, is an activity in the culture. It is a figuring out activity within a certain world of values and judgements, even when we believe we are in compliance with our rules of abstinence and neutrality. If analyzable analyzands place us in an idealized knowledge position which makes less rispid those ideological marks of our sayings, it is common in adolescents that their extreme sensibility to these features make the habitual interpretation task particularly difficult. Which analyst is conscious about their persuasive modes, of their saying aesthetics and of the set in act of their saying? Every analysis should face us against that blindness, as original points, re-inaugurated in every single experience. But it is with adolescents where this is more commonly reproached on us. They are outlines that adolescents have not adopted despite their availability. They challenge us to experiment what they themselves are going through, and to making words arise from the experience itself, although shaking with no seduction. Perhaps to laugh at these hesitations in us and start incorporating slowly the fortitude of that precariousness.

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Summary

Starting from brief accounts of analysis, the author has wanted to outline some of the partial features of work with adolescents. The intensity of the set in scene and in act, the multiplicity of the discursive modes in the session, the strength of the speculative moments, and how the analyst remains convoked in these ludic modes with words, gestures, scene setting and writing, to transit from specularity to transitive (symbolic) fashions that enable the adolescent to appropriate experiences and, through them, singular features and desires, which they do not have available as part of their subjectivity.

Key Words: Act. Adolescence. Discourse. Interpretation. Play. Adolescents Psychoanalysis.